A crowd in medieval dress, soldiers in armor among them, stands by a river below a castle and stares up at an enormous tower of red, ochre and black arches, with a faint, ghostly image of the space shuttle Columbia blended into it. Baskets of artichokes, a coffin with lilies and a candle, and an iron resting on folded socks fill the foreground. The painting is an assembled jigsaw puzzle with a few pieces missing at the edges.
Illustration: Ken Pond Creative

Underneath Atlantis: Mike Leinbach and the Lessons of the Space Shuttle

Mike Leinbach was waiting by the runway when Columbia didn't come home. In recordings published here for the first time, NASA's last shuttle launch director walks through Atlantis, the two accidents, and the decision he still can't explain.

The first rule of the tour was about his name. “My name is Mike,” he told the group. “It’s not Mr. Leinbach. If you call me Mr. Leinbach, I will ignore you.” Questions were welcome at any time; if he said something that didn’t make sense, they should “grab me by the jacket, whatever.” Classified questions were another matter. “If you ask anything classified, I’ll shoot you,” he said, before adding that there is very little classified information about the shuttle anyway.

It was Saturday, January 13, 2024, at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex in Florida, and Mike Leinbach was leading members of the National Space Society on the society’s first tour of the space center. From 2000 until the program ended in 2011, he was NASA’s space shuttle launch director, the person in charge of the launch team on launch day, and he was the launch director for Columbia’s last mission. The group stood in front of a full-size shuttle stack: the orange external fuel tank between two white solid rocket boosters, with red fittings marking where the orbiter would have attached. They were mock-ups. “Inside, when we see Atlantis,” he said, “that’s the real deal.”

Mike Leinbach, in a patterned blue shirt and a headset microphone, points at a large illuminated screen; the cover of Bringing Columbia Home and his signature appear in the lower right corner.
Mike Leinbach, NASA’s space shuttle launch director from 2000 to 2011, with the cover of the book he wrote with Jonathan H. Ward.Photo: Ken Pond Creative

He came to the job the way many children of the early space age did, through a car radio. On May 5, 1961, his family was driving from Northern Virginia to visit relatives in Pennsylvania when his father pulled off the road. “Kids, we’re about to hear history made here,” his father said. It was Alan Shepard’s flight, the first time an American went to space. “And I was eight,” Leinbach said. “I didn’t know it at the time, but I’m sure that’s what set the bit in my mind about working for NASA.”

He studied architecture and then engineering, joined the Kennedy Space Center in 1984, and spent more than twenty years on the shuttle launch team. In 2018, he and Jonathan H. Ward published Bringing Columbia Home, an account of the search for the shuttle after it broke apart over Texas.

THE FIRST REUSABLE SPACESHIP

Leinbach walked the group through a launch the way a launch director would. At T minus 6.6 seconds, the orbiter’s three main engines lit. At zero, the boosters ignited and the bolts holding the stack to the pad were blown. Solid rocket fuel, he said, has the consistency of a pencil eraser, and once it’s burning there is no stopping it. “Once you ignite it, you can’t throttle it, and you can’t put it out.” The boosters burned for about two minutes, came down under parachutes in the Atlantic off Jacksonville, and were retrieved by ships, taken apart, cleaned and sent back to Utah to be refueled. Only the external tank was thrown away. “We never got any part of the external fuel tank back,” he said.

“This is where reusability started,” he said. The orbiter itself came back and landed like a glider, and the program reused its hardware for 30 years. “I’m not taking away from Elon because he sure does do a phenomenal job,” he said of SpaceX’s founder. But the shuttle “was the first reusable spacecraft ever.” Before it, “every astronaut rode in a brand-new spacecraft on a brand-new rocket every time.” The shuttles flew 135 missions between 1981 and 2011.

Inside the exhibit, under Atlantis itself, he asked the group to picture a typical mission: seven astronauts, fourteen days, in the crew cabin in front of them. “Imagine yourself in orbit with six of your closest friends in this volume for two weeks,” he said.

Then he talked about the tiles. Strip them off, he said, and the orbiter “would look like any other airplane Boeing built,” an “aluminum-framed machine” with an aluminum skin. The tiles were glued on, and early in the program they kept falling off. “Remember in the movie,” he said, “the one engineer said the heat shield bond keeps failing, the tiles keep falling off? Well, we had a bad glue, right? What do you do when you have a bad glue? Get a better glue.”

That was the short version. NASA’s record of the fix is longer. Each tile was bonded with silicone adhesive to a felt pad, which was bonded in turn to the aluminum, and by 1979 the bond had lost about half its strength. That October, engineers chose to strengthen the inner face of every tile so the bond would hold. Installing Columbia’s 30,759 tiles took technicians twenty months, working three shifts a day. The felt pad, about an eighth of an inch thick, was there to absorb vibration and the metal’s movement as it heated and cooled. In the cold of orbit, Leinbach said, the orbiter “shrunk by over an inch,” and back on the runway it grew again.

CHALLENGER, UNDERGROUND

Outside, at the boosters, he had pointed to a seam just above the ring where each booster attached to the tank. The boosters arrived from Utah in four sections, which were stacked “just like dominoes,” and the seams between them were called field joints. That one, he said, was “one of the field joints that doomed the Challenger.”

The night before Challenger’s launch, engineers at the booster’s maker, Morton Thiokol, recommended against launching in temperatures below 53 degrees. Thiokol’s managers reversed the recommendation before midnight. On the morning of January 28, 1986, it was 36 degrees at launch. The O-ring seals in the aft field joint of the right booster failed, hot gas escaped through the joint and burned into the external tank, and the shuttle broke apart about 73 seconds after liftoff. All seven astronauts died.

In the exhibit’s debris room, part of a memorial called Forever Remembered, Leinbach stood beside a section of Challenger’s left fuselage wall, still bearing the American flag, that had been brought up from the floor of the Atlantic in 1986. It was about twice as long when it was recovered, he said. “We cut that piece in half to reach its final resting place.” The rest of what was recovered from Challenger lies in two retired Minuteman missile silos on Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, about 15 miles south. “Challenger pieces were lowered one by one down inside that missile silo,” he said. “One on top of the other.” A concrete cap went on top. He said it had been opened only twice since: once so engineers could study Challenger’s engines for help with a problem on the fleet, and once to bring out the piece now on display. Did the engines help? “It did,” he said, “a little bit, not a lot.”

THE PICTURES NOBODY TOOK

Columbia launched on Thursday, January 16, 2003. About 82 seconds into the climb, a piece of insulating foam broke off the external tank and struck the leading edge of the left wing. Leinbach described it as “about the size of a carry-on,” “so not very big.” Foam is light, so the piece slowed almost at once in the air while the shuttle kept climbing, “but it hit the wing at over 500 miles per hour.”

The ground cameras caught the strike, but not a clear view of where it hit. “One camera that we used to characterize impact was out of focus on launch day for Columbia,” he said. “Another camera didn’t work at all.”

While Columbia was in orbit, engineers worried about the strike asked for pictures of the wing from the Department of Defense. “That request was turned down by shuttle program management,” Leinbach said, “which to me is the most confounding decision in the shuttle program.” He knows the people who made it. “I just don’t get it. They don’t talk about it.” At lunch afterward, answering the group’s questions, he went further. “It’s the most confounding thing I’ve ever witnessed in my career,” he said. “They’re good people. But they made that decision and I don’t know why.”

He had a guess, and he offered it as one. Perhaps the managers asked themselves what they would do with the pictures. “What if it shows that the vehicle’s doomed? Now what do we do?” he said, imagining their side of it. “Do we tell Rick?” Rick Husband was Columbia’s commander. Husband had, in fact, been told about the strike. On the eighth day of the flight, the flight director Steve Stich e-mailed him and the pilot, Willie McCool, that experts had reviewed the launch photography: “there is absolutely no concern for entry.”

Then Leinbach took on the question people always ask: could the crew have been saved? “And unfortunately, the answer is yes,” he said, and then caught himself. “It’s a bad choice of words.” If NASA had known early enough, he said, it could have rushed Atlantis, the next shuttle in line, through its processing and out to the launch pad. “We would have strung a tether between the two ships, and one by one the astronauts would have gone from Columbia,” he said, into Atlantis. By the study he said he did, there would have been two days to spare. “But we had to know that by day two.”

They didn’t, and he said the calendar made it worse. Columbia launched on the Thursday before the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday. The program managers, he said, met on Friday, then took Saturday, Sunday and Monday off. “So right there, we were on day five,” he said. “Even if we had known, we were out of time.”

On February 1, as Columbia came home, sensors inside the left wing started failing one after another. “We saw it happening,” he said. Superheated gas, “well over 3,000 degrees,” he said, had gotten in through the breach, and the wing’s aluminum structure melts at around 1,100. Columbia failed, he said, when the left wing melted “from the inside out.”

Searchers later found a crumpled hydraulic control panel from the cockpit. When engineers unfolded it, some of its switches had been moved by hand before the ship came apart. The panel sat beside the pilot’s seat. McCool knew the hydraulic system had failed, Leinbach said. “He was trying to restart the hydraulic system.”

BRINGING COLUMBIA HOME

That night, Leinbach led Kennedy’s Rapid Response Team, “a group of about 80 of us that would go anywhere in the world that the shuttle ended up where it wasn’t supposed to be,” to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, and he stayed for twelve days.

The search took three months and more than 25,000 people from 270 organizations. They walked East Texas in lines, looking at the ground and up in the trees, across streams and through ponds; the ground search alone covered a strip 120 miles long and 10 miles wide. It was February, it was cold, and the woods were thick with thorns. “Our guys had to wrap themselves in duct tape to keep the thorns from cutting their clothes,” he said. Some of the heaviest pieces, he said, pumps from the main engines, hit the ground at about 1,500 miles per hour and buried themselves 12 to 14 feet down in the mud; some are still out there. In all, searchers recovered more than 84,000 pieces, about 38 percent of Columbia by weight. Two of the searchers, Jules “Buzz” Mier and Charles Krenek, were killed when their helicopter crashed.

The debris went to a hangar near the shuttle runway at Kennedy, where Leinbach led the team that pieced it back together. The National Transportation Safety Board, he said, advised NASA to form two teams. One, led by the flight director Paul Hill, would work only from data and photographs. Leinbach’s would work only from the wreckage. “Just take the debris and figure it out,” he said they were told. “And if those two teams conclude the same thing, you got it knocked.” They did. The foam strike had let the gas in, and the wreckage proved it, as he put it, “from an engineering forensics perspective. Independently.”

That summer, a test settled whether something as light as foam could do that much damage. On July 7, 2003, at the Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio, a gas gun fired a 1.67-pound block of foam at a carbon leading-edge panel that had flown on Atlantis. It left a hole about 16 by 17 inches. As Leinbach put it, it “punched a hole in the wing.”

Since 2015, the debris room has put pieces of both shuttles on public view, the first time NASA had shown either. Columbia’s six forward window frames sit in a case with the broken glass beside them; “those pieces of glass in the corner are precisely how we found” them, he said. Along the walls are cases for all fourteen astronauts, holding things their families lent. “The idea is to get to know the individuals better,” he said.

CALLING NO-GO

Asked about the biggest misconception people have about running a launch, he said, “I’d have to say how easy it is.” The launch team was full of people who knew a single system completely; he remembered a liquid oxygen specialist named Mac who had come over from Apollo. When Mac said, “Mike, we need to turn left,” Leinbach said, “we were going to turn left.” His own job was to know how the systems worked together and to trust the people who knew each one. “I wasn’t an expert on any of them, but I had the people on the team that were.” Watching that team solve a hard problem, he said, “was really glorious.”

The hard part was something else. “The hard part is calling no go in the face of everybody else being go,” he said. “I never had to do that for real, but I was prepared to do it.”

He was blunt about the two times it mattered most. “We did not stand down for the O-rings” on Challenger, he said. “We did not stand down for the foam on Columbia.” He set them beside a time NASA did stop. In July 1999, about five seconds after Columbia lifted off on a mission commanded by Eileen Collins, the first woman to command a shuttle, a damaged wire shorted and knocked out the controllers on two of its main engines; backups took over, and the flight went on. NASA grounded the fleet for months, against the objections of many people, he said, and inspected the wiring on every shuttle. “We found thousands of little tiny little rubs on some of the insulation,” he said. “Some of them were all the way down to the conductor, ready to short.”

After Columbia, no shuttle came home without an inspection. “After the Columbia accident, we had a requirement to study every square inch of the outside of the space shuttle before we were allowed to come home,” he said. “Every square inch.” Canada built an extension that doubled the reach of the shuttle’s robotic arm so its cameras could see all of it, and the pictures went to engineers in Houston. Crews carried repair materials, from “a material like a spackle” for small dings to thin titanium plates that could be screwed down over a bad spot, “just enough to get home.” And if the damage was beyond repair, there had to be a safe haven, somewhere the crew could wait while NASA launched a rescue. In the space station years, the station itself was the safe haven. For the one later mission that couldn’t reach the station, the last Hubble servicing flight in 2009, a second shuttle, Endeavour, stood ready.

ZERO

Under Atlantis, he had told the group about the part of the job he loved most. On landing day, he said, the launch director’s role “was largely ceremonial.” He would wait beside the runway. “The best thing I ever did in my job was greet the astronauts when they got off the ship,” he said. “Walk down and shake their hand. They’d be kind of wobbly, you know.” Two weeks in orbit does that.

On the morning of February 1, 2003, he was out by the runway at Kennedy, waiting for Columbia. “We had a big countdown clock out there,” he said. “And it counted down to zero. And at zero, Columbia should have been on the runway right in front of us. And it just wasn’t there. We just did not know where it was.”

Much of what he showed the group that day was built after that morning: the extended arm that looks at every square inch, the spackle and the titanium plates, the safe haven. Describing the repair kits, he had put their whole purpose in one sentence. “That’s all we wanted,” he said, “to get the astronauts home.”

The short version

  • On January 13, 2024, Mike Leinbach, NASA’s space shuttle launch director from 2000 to 2011, led a tour of the Atlantis exhibit at Kennedy Space Center: the first reusable spaceship, the tiles that held it together, and its two accidents.
  • On Columbia, engineers’ requests for pictures of the damaged wing were turned down: “the most confounding thing I’ve ever witnessed in my career.” A rescue might have been possible, he said, “but we had to know that by day two.”
  • After Columbia, no shuttle came home without an inspection, a repair kit and a safe haven. “That’s all we wanted,” he said, “to get the astronauts home.”
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Mike Leinbach’s words are from Ken Pond’s recordings of his tour of the Space Shuttle Atlantis exhibit and of the question-and-answer session at lunch afterward, January 13, 2024. Other facts are from NASA; the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (1986); the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s report (2003); collectSPACE (2015); and Michael D. Leinbach and Jonathan H. Ward, Bringing Columbia Home (Arcade, 2018).